Joint Criminal Liability for Murder | Case Study

Joint Criminal Liability for Murder Case Study initiationThis assignment will attempt to analyse less(prenominal)er iniquitous liabilities persisting up to stronger fell liabilities for entirely disuniteies involved in a possible conviction of murder by focussing on the major themes of contending and procuring, aiding and abetting, accessory liability, illegitimate pull downing, grievous bodied equipment casualty ( devastation resulting) and causation.Joint Criminal Liability between Andy, Matthew appreciateAre both Andy and Matthew evenly chief(prenominal) wrongdoers for the direct of distinguishing criminal liability?Criminal liabilityA person who commits the acts which form whole or part of the actus reus of the crime is known as a principal in the first degree Osland v R (1998) 1It can be derived from the facts that both Andy and Matthew were present at the scene to carry out a joint criminal enterprise Tangye (1997) 2 as there was an hold equalment Tangye (199 7) 3 do between the two to seize the managers of large supermarkets in their homes and hurtle them to bribe to their supermarkets and open the safes. On the facts it cannot be established that derivative liability exists between the two or any failure to agree to such actions is present Osland v R (1998) 4rather an acting in concert which may bring about the burden of equally placing responsibility on each individual for the acts of the other R v Lowery and King (No.2) (1972) 5 both(prenominal) Andy and Matthew may be charged with crew under S.321 to commit and offence does this extend to Jimmy?ConspiracyAndy puts his plans to Mathew who agrees to take part in the robberies, for a percentage of the proceeds under S.321 of the crimes Act 1958 this harmony made between Andy and Matthew resulted in the involvement and representation of the offence thusly may lead to a conclusion of guilt in conspiracy to commit that offence. Does this apply to Jimmys level of involvement?Actu s ReusConspiracy has been defined as an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful meansR V Jones (1832) 6 there is sack uply no question of dispute that both Andy and Mathew immovable that the best management of ma magnate quick money was to execute the agreed criminal act. To establish difference of s.321 it may be inferred that Jimmys conduct of providing a safe preindication endeavorionally perverted the course of rightness or intended to pervert the administration of public justice throng v. Robinson (1963) 7 hence making Jimi a complicit in the commission of a crime.Mens ReaThe establishment of both Andy and Matthewss targetal agreement to infract s.321 is apparent on the facts posing the question whether a conspiracy charge is as effective as heavier crusadeed substantive charges forthcoming Hoar v R (1981) 8 Jimmy may be tack together guilty under the equally applicable test if it is demonst set outd that the provision of the safe house was a fur therance to the common nominate R. v. Tripodi (1955) 9 in effect being liable for accessorial liability cod to the counselling and procuring involved with Andy and Matthews main(prenominal) offences.DefencesThe scope of mens rea clearly applied to Jimmy is debatable a conspiracy is proved by secern of the actual scathe of the agreement made or accepted or by evidence from which an agreement to effect common goals or purpose is inferred. Gerakiteys v R (1984) 10. No evidence of actual terms of the agreement provides a clear entry point before the act or common object to the commission of the offence by Jimmy R v Theophanous (2003) 11The mere providing of a safe house provides only an inference for a jury to draw upon after the fact of Jimis level of participation. In this uninfected the evidence may fall short of establishing a clear level of involvement R V Darby (1982)12.Due to the possible grey area in establishing Jimmys intention to pervert the course of justice the hat chway of an acquittal under s.321 may result, if the inference of the oert act in itself is not proved beyond liable doubt aligning common purpose against other substantive criminal acts R V Darby (1982) 13.Both Andy and Matthew may be charged with Burglary does this extend to Aggravated Burglary?BurglaryAndy and Matthew may be guilty of burglary for jailbreak into Joes home as trespassers with an intention to assault both Joe and Betty.Actus ReusAs we can see from the facts the actions of both Andy and Matthew in breaking into Joes home may substitute the trespassing and home for the purpose of a building. Case?Mens ReaOn the facts this was actioned knowingly without permission with a firm intent to commit an assault R v collins (1972) 14Aggravated BurglaryIf burglary can be established between Andy and Matthew they may be too be found guilty of aggravated burglary collectable to the carrying of a firearm at the time and knowingly entering with intent to do so.Actus ReusBoth Ma tthew and Andy entered intending to assault Joe carrying loaded pistols at the time of their entry. With no apparent reason on the facts to dispute that Joe was not present in his house, hence an inference may be drawn by the jury not suggesting otherwise R v Verde (2009) 15Mens ReaBoth Andy and Matthew on the facts intended to threaten to realise injury to a person inside the house if he they were disturbed during the burglary R v Verde 2009 16. They similarly had the weapon for a purpose connected with the burglary as discussed about albeit for armed looting R v Kolb Adams (2007) 17.Matthew may also be charged of extortion with threat to killExtortion with threat to killFurthermore on the above aggravated burglary charge this may be coupled with Matthews threat to kill Betty which may contravene S.27A B regarding extortion with a threat to kill.Actus ReusMatthew clearly made a demand of Betty to lie down on the floor and remain silent or he will kill her. Leaving Joe fearing f or his sustenance and that of his wife if they did not submit R v Lawrence (1980) 18Mens ReaOn the facts Matthewss intention to threaten to kill was an attempt to create fear of the infliction of harm Ryan v Cuhl (1979) 19.Is Andy liable for the common law crime of false impounding against Betty?False imprisonmentAndy may be liable for the Criminal offence of false imprisonment due to unlawful restraint and threats to both Joe and Betty.Actus ReusAs we can see from the facts Andy drags Betty into another room tying her work force and feet with rope and taping her mouth in coif for her not to scream. Clearly unlawfully restraining Betty from her liberty to granting immunity of movement, furthermore confining her into the custody of one room Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 20Mens ReaAndy held a clear intention to unlawfully restrain Betty against her will as a consequence of his threats to kill her and Joe if they did not comply R v Garrett (1988) 21DefencesThere is little to no likelih ood that Andy may raise a defence of lawful apology for his actions upon the facts Blackstone 22Andys LiabilityIs Andy liable for contravening S.22 23 of the Crimes Act 1958 regarding Bettys un born(p) child.Conduct en riskinessing life/Reckless conduct endangering sound injuryAndy may be charged as a result of engaging voluntarily in the conduct of restraining Betty without lawful excuse that may have placed her unborn child in danger of death. S.22 23Actus ReusIt can be clearly established that Betty whimpered that she was 7 months pregnant, tho Andy voluntarily and recklessly proceed without lawful excuse to assault and restrain causation possible serious injury by way of miscarriage on Bettys unborn child R v Crabbe (1985)23Mens ReaApplying the test in Ryan v pusher (1966) 24 to the possible death by way of miscarriage to Bettys unborn child. The Jury may infer that this possibility was contemplated by Andy as a result of his continued restraint and threat to kill. Furthe rmore evidence of Andy contacting politics alluded to his realisation and contemplation of danger or serious injury.DefencesThere may be a stripped defence to debate the intent on Andys behalf to place Bettys unborn in danger by the succeeding contacting of authorities furthermore death did not result, hence the actus reus of the consequence failed to occur R v NuriI (1990) 25 however a finding on the continuation of Bettys restraint at the time of the offence may weigh more heavily against Andys contemplation R v Crabbe (1985).26. It must also be noted that in R v Hutty (1953) 27a person is not a being until he or she if fully born in a living state however R v West (1848) 28 negates this and still establishes homicide if a child is born and subsequently dies.Does Andys use of stolen indorse plates be theft for the purposes of s.72 (1) s.73 (5) s.73 (12)TheftAndy may be charged with theft by the action of stealing or dishonestly appropriating another persons licence plates wi th the intention of permanently depriving them from the owner.Actus ReusClearly Andy was unauthorised to appropriate or physical take and carry away The king v James Lapier (1784)29. Another persons tangible airscrew Oxford v Moss (1979) 30in this case being licence plates for the commission of the offence.Mens ReaIt may be inferred that Andy had specific intent to dishonestly deprive s.73(12) the owner of rightful possession of the licence plates for his own right to use Stein v Henshall (1976)31 furthermore this can be strengthen by the lack of consent R v Senese (2004) 32Are both Andy and Matthew liable for kidnapping Joe under S.63a kidnappingAndy and Matthew may be liable for demanding Joe to drive to the supermarket to intentionally open the safe for their advantage in return for his release.Actus ReusOn the facts we can clearly see that Joes own(prenominal) liberty or freedom of choice was remote primarily by way of a threat to kill unless he complies Wellard v R(1978) 33. Secondly this was performed by Joe being carried away in the form of a car by Andy and Matthew. Thirdly this was achieved by force without consent. This may be inferred by a Jury as his wife Betty was clearly in an hurt state. Fourthly at no point was there any justified lawful excuse R v D (1984) 34.Mens ReaAndy and Matthew both shared intent in agreeing to perform the kidnapping in order to fulfil their common purpose of execute the robbery. CaseDid the actions of Joe opening the safe constitute a criminal offence under s.9AG.DuressJoe may not be found guilty of a criminal offence pertaining to the opening of the safe under duress due to a threat to kill Betty.Actus ReusOn the facts a threat of immediate death was made towards Betty unless both remained compliant. Joe being clearly overborne by this verifying threat subsequently led his will to be placed under duress, furthermore serious personal violence overbearing his ability to become resistant or no opportunity to restrai n lead may lead to a strong justification for his actions of opening the safe Attorney-General v Whelan (1934) 35Mens ReaClearly Joe had no intent to perform this criminal offence if he was not under duress, his will was overborne with fear for his life and that of his wife.DefencesJoe has a strong case in establishing duress R v Brown (1986). 36 Furthermore a jury may infer that carrying out the conduct was the only reasonable way that the threatened harm could have been avoided. s.9AG. (b)Are both Andy Matthew guilty of committing Robbery/Armed Robbery contravening s.75 s.75A?Robbery/Armed robberyBoth Andy Matthew as an accessory may be equally guilty of robbery for stealing the content of a safe by force by dint of Joe by means of fear with the use of firearms.Actus ReusJoe was awake(predicate) of the theft and subsequently was compelled by force or fear to submit to Andys demands to open the supermarket and safe, this prevention by violence or threat establishes robbery un der s.75 the use of firearm establishes armed robbery for the purpose of s.75 a (1) enabling the two to have the safe opened and its contents permanently deprived of the owner. It is clear that Joe being the supermarket manager satisfying s.75 a (1) as the applicable person or custodian of the property in this instance metalworker v Desmond (1965)37Mens ReaIt is clear that Andy and Matthew intended to place Joe under duress by the use of a deadly weapon to intimidate Joe to fear for his life and that of his wife. caseDefencesRegardless if Andy believed he had an honest entitlement by way of his intentions of support for the Karen tribe as a claim for defence, it is unnecessary to prove this R v Langham. (1984) 38 furthermore would not constitute lawful excuse at any rate under the Firearms Act (1996) s.132 (2). Thirdly a claim for military necessity would not apply due to his departure from the SAS and proportionality arguments contravening multiple international humanitarian law co nventions regarding legal use of force.39Andys Liability over Joes serious injuries sustained.Causing serious injury intentionallyAndy may be charged under s.16 17 s.22 for pistol whipping Joe until he became unconscious.Actus ReusIt may be established on the facts that Joe clearly suffered no less than serious grievous bodily harm by Andys act of pistol whipping to the point of swooning DPP v Smith (1961)40. Due to this act being in furtherance of a crime it would constitute without lawful excuse for the purposes of s.16 of the crimes act 1958.Mens reaAndys intent may be established sufficiently in causing intentionally serious injury through the furtherance of a crime or alternatively through recklessness. Meyers v R (1997) 41 It is possible that recklessness may also be established given the record of Andys training received through the SAS in the continued use of such force being reasonable foreseeable that such a consequence may arise R v Coleman (1990) 42.Andy may also be liable under s.22 for recklessly engaging in conduct that renders Joe in danger of death with the carrying of a firearm it also may be sufficient to be deemed guilty for grievous bodily harm and breech of s.31a R v Faure (1999)43. as a probable consequence he may be deemed just as blameworthy as the conduct of one who does an act intended to kill or to do grievous bodily harm. R v Crabbe (1985) 44Is Matthew triable as a principal offender as an abettor for his involvement in the commission of a crime under S.323?Abettors in indictable offences are triable as principal offendersMatthew may be charged for assisting Andy at the scenes of the crime furthermore supporting and procuring by taking appropriate steps towards the commission of the offence under S.323 Crimes act 1958.Actus ReusMatthew agreeing to take part in the robberies hence satisfies the preparation arm or to abet in agreeing to the commission of the offences Thambiah v R (1966)45, Secondly clearly he aided when he broke into the home acting in concert, hence not derivative to the principal offence also by carrying loaded pistols and when he threatened Betty and Joe performing the subsequent false imprisonment Osland v R (1998) 46Thirdly Matthew counselled by keeping nit and not ever-changing the course of action R V Whitefield (1983) 47 whilst the robbery took place. These actions show the series of steps undertaken in the commission of the offences constituting a breach of s.323.Mens ReaMatthew may be found guilty due to the fact that at no time Matthews intention knowingly or wilfully changed to the knowledge and acceptance of the pre formed sequence of events R v Bainbridge (1959)48.1 Osland v R (1998) 159 ALR 1702 Tangye (1997) 92 a Crim R 5453 ibid at 5454 Osland v R (1998) 159 ALR 1705 R v Lowery and King No.2 (1972) VR 5606 R V Jones (1832) 4 b Ad 345 at 3497 James v. Robinson (1963) 1 CLR 593 at p 6188 Hoar v R (1981) 148 CLR 329 R. v. Tripodi (1955) SCR 43810 Gerakiteys v R (1984) 153 CL R 317 at 711 R v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216.12 R V Darby (1982) 40 ALR13 R V Darby (1982) 40 ALR 60114 R v Collins (1972) 2 All ER15 R v Verde (2009) VSCA 1616 R v Verde 2009 VSCA 1617 R v Kolb (2007) QCA 180 18 R v Lawrence (1980) 32 ALR 7219 Ryan v Cuhl (1979) VR 31520 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 61221 R v Garrett (1988) 30 SASR 392.22 Blackstone, Book 4, Chapter 1423 R v Crabbe 1985 156 CLR 464 46924 Ryan v Walker (1966) VR 55325 R v NURI (1990) VSCA 726 R v Crabbe 1985 156 CLR 464 46927 R v Hutty (1953) VLR 338 at 33928 R v West (1848) 2 Cox cc 50029 The king v James Lapier (1784) 168 ER 263 and Wallis v Lane 1964 VR 29330 Oxford v Moss (1979) 68 Cr App Rep 18331 Stein v. Henshall (976)V.R. 61232 R v Senese (2004) VSCA 136SDSD33 Wellard v R(1978) 67 Cr App R 36434 R v D (1984) 2 all er 44935 Attorney-General v Whelan (1934) IR 518 at 52636 R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33 at 37.37 Smith v Desmond (1965) AC 960.38 R v Langham. (1984) 36 SASR 4839 Article 52 of Additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions40 DPP v Smith 1961 AC 29041 Meyers v R 1997 HCA 43 (1997) 147 ALR 440 (1997)42 R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSW 46743 R v Faure (1999) 2 VR 53744 R v Crabbe 1985 HCA 22 (1985) 156 CLR 464 (26 March 1985)45 Thambiah v R (1966) AC 3746 Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 31647 R V Whitefield (1983) 79 Cr App R 3648 R v Bainbridge (1959) 3 ALL ER 200